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Who Should Read This Paper?   Parties that may find this paper of interest include 
government agencies considering the deployment of data mining technologies in the 
counter-terrorism context, policy makers in the field of national security, counter-terrorism 
and law enforcement agencies, bodies that oversee intelligence or national security 
activities, and non-governmental organizations focussed on the field of human rights or 
national security. 
 
Executive Summary 
  
1. Counter-terrorism data mining raises concerns with regard to the right to privacy, data 
protection principles and the right to non-discrimination.  In addition, actions based on 
the results of data mining operations may result in “second-order” human rights 
infringements. 
2. Even where states provide explicit legal authorization for data mining to combat 
terrorism, broad scale programmes are unlikely to conform to the principle of 
proportionality due to the resulting interference with the right to respect for private life 
of a large number of innocent individuals.  Additionally, programmes that prove to be of 
limited effectiveness or are unable to demonstrate their effectiveness cannot constitute 
a necessary means of protecting national security. 
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3. Counter-terrorism data mining may involve a violation of a number of data protection 
principles.  Although exclusion and derogation clauses with respect to the fields of 
national security and criminal law enforcement are common features of data protection 
instruments, Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union as 
well as large portions of the Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data always apply.  
Additionally, the Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of 
Personal Data call for any exceptions to its principles to be “as few as possible” and 
made known to the public.  Finally, the European Court of Human Rights has made 
frequent reference to data protection principles and the Convention on Automatic 
Processing in its jurisprudence on the right to respect for private life guaranteed by 
Article 8 of the ECHR, thus treating these principles as an inherent part of the right to 
respect for private life.   
4. Data mining programmes that are based exclusively or to a decisive extent on one or 
more of the grounds that are treated as inherently suspect (such as race, ethnicity, 
religion or sex) may never be compatible with the right to non-discrimination 
guaranteed by international human rights law.  Data mining programmes that involve 
differential treatment based on other grounds may be justified if they are carried out in 
pursuit of a legitimate aim and in a manner that is proportionate to that aim. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This is the third and final report under Work Package 6 of the DETECTER project.  Here, we 
address the most pertinent legal issues for data mining in the counter-terrorism context.  
These fall within the areas of privacy or respect for private life, data protection, and non-
discrimination.  It is worth noting, however, that in addition to first-order violations that 
implicate these rights, second-order violations may occur through the use of the results of 
data mining.  For instance, as a result of a data mining initiative, an individual could be  
arrested as a potential terrorist and be denied guarantees of due process or even be subject 
to inhuman treatment.1  We do not address such second-order violations here.  We 
conclude this report with a set of best practices and guidelines for providing human rights 
compatibility in connection with the use of data mining in counter-terrorism. 
 
2. Privacy 
2.1. Law 
 
There are a number of legal instruments of relevance to European countries that provide for 
the protection of privacy.  Within the framework of the United Nations, there is the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR).  Of relevance for European countries is the Council of Europe’s 
                                                     
1
 See, for an extreme example, the case of Maher Arar.  His designation as a terrorist led to numerous 
violations of national and international law.  Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian 
Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, “Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Factual 
Background, Vol. I” (September 2006). See also the discussion in D8.2, pp. 31-32, explaining how 
poor or misguided data and information collection practices can lead to unwarranted impacts on human 
rights, including that individuals may have “their travels and interactions with law enforcement . . .  
tracked.” Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice, “A Review of the FBI's 
Investigations of Certain Domestic Advocacy Groups” (September 2010) at 188. 
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Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and, 
within the European Union, the Charter of Fundamental Rights.2 
2.1.1. Scope 
2.1.1.1. UN Framework 
 
Both Article 12 of the UDHR and Article 17 of the ICCPR prohibit “arbitrary interference” 
with any person’s “privacy, family, home or correspondence”, whereas the ICCPR also 
prohibits “unlawful interference”.  Similarly, the UDHR prohibits attacks upon personal 
honour and reputation and the ICCPR prohibits “unlawful” attacks.  Additionally, both 
instruments impose upon states parties a positive obligation to provide legal protections 
against arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy or unlawful attacks on reputation or 
honour.3 
 
The term “privacy” is not defined in the ICCPR nor in General Comment 16, which was 
drafted as an elaborative supplement to Article 17 by the UN Human Rights Committee 
(HRC).4  However, the General Comment does contain clarifications of the terms “arbitrary 
interference”, “unlawful”, “family”, and “home”.  Notably, it defines “home” as the “place 
where a person resides or carries out his usual occupation.”5  Thus, the General Comment 
suggests that Article 17 applies to an individual’s workplace and work-related life in addition 
to the non-vocational sphere with which the term “private” has more traditionally been 
associated.  “Correspondence” within the meaning of the ICCPR includes 
telecommunications according to the General Comment.6  The General Comment also adds 
that “searches of a person’s home should be restricted to a search for necessary evidence 
and should not be allowed to amount to harassment.”7 
 
Of significance for the subject of data mining is the inclusion of commentary on the storage 
of personal data within databanks in paragraph 10 of the General Comment.  This paragraph 
states that the gathering and storage of personal data “must” be regulated by law.  It also 
calls on states to implement “effective measures” to protect such data from unauthorized 
access or use in a manner contrary to the ICCPR.  Persons within states parties should also 
be enabled to ascertain which authorities collect or retain their personal information, and be 
provided with the right to have that information corrected or deleted in the event that it is 
false.  
 
In terms of the application of the ICCPR by the HRC, although there have not been any 
complaints concerning data mining, the case of Rojas García v. Columbia,8 may shed some 
light on what implications the Covenant might have for state utilization of data mining in the 
counter-terrorism context as well as consequences that may flow from the use of data 
                                                     
2
 As a result of the Lisbon Treaty, the Charter has become “hard law” for the European Union, opening 
up the possibility that claims under the Charter may be brought, with the European Court of Justice as 
the court of last resort for such claims.  
3
 Art. 12, second sentence UDHR; Art. 17(2) ICCPR. 
4
 S. Joseph, J. Schultz and M. Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, 
Materials, and Commentary, 2nd edn. (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2004), p. 477. 
5
 UN Human Rights Committee, “General Comment No. 16: The right to respect of privacy, family, 
home and correspondence, and protection of honour and reputation (Art. 17)” (1988) at para. 5 
(emphasis added). 
6
 Ibid., para. 8. 
7
 Ibid., para. 8. 
8
 (687/96). 
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mining.  Rojas García dealt with the physical search of a family’s home done by police in 
quick-raid fashion.  The police, however, raided the wrong house.  The HRC found that the 
raid constituted an impermissible interference with the claimant’s Art. 17 rights since “the 
State party’s arguments fail[ed] to justify the conduct described.”9 Joseph, Schultz, and 
Castan note that it is unclear whether the decision indicates that all mistaken searches 
would constitute a breach of Article 17 rights.10  If the state party can present evidence that 
explains how the mistake occurred, it may suffice to show that the mistaken search was not 
arbitrary.11 
 
Apart from complaints, the HRC has commented in the context of the review of state reports 
on the implications of the Covenant for surveillance powers of state authorities.  These 
comments indicate that a state’s legal system should provide safeguards against the use of 
such powers and be subject to independent oversight, with particular preference for judicial 
review.12  The Committee has also expressed concern when surveillance powers are vested 
in certain parties who may be in a position to abuse such power.  For instance, it was 
troubled that prosecutors could order surveillance in the case of Poland13 and that the 
Postmaster-General was empowered to open and examine items in the mail in Zimbabwe.14  
With implicit reference to paragraph 10 of General Comment 16, the HRC expressed concern 
that the legal system of the Republic of Korea did not provide “adequate remedies” for the 
correction of information in databases nor for instances of abuse or misuse of such 
databases.15 
 
2.1.1.2. European Framework 
 
The ECHR provides a privacy-related right in the form of Article 8.  Article 8(1) declares that 
“[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.”  In addition, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
calls for the respect of privacy in its Article 7.  That provision states that “[e]veryone has the 
right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications.” 
 
In contrast to the HRC, there is a relatively rich body of jurisprudence concerning the right to 
privacy from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and its predecessor, the 
European Commission of Human Rights.  The ECtHR has stated that “private life” within the 
meaning of Article 8 represents a broad concept “not susceptible to exhaustive definition.”16  
Cases involving subjects such as name, gender, sexual orientation and sexual life, identity, 
personal development, and the establishment and development of personal relationships 
have been recognized under Article 8.17  As with the ICCPR, the ECtHR has also recognized 
the inclusion of business or professional activities within the remit of Article 8.18  The Court 
has stated that there is “a zone of interaction of a person with others, even in a public 
                                                     
9
 Para. 10.3. 
10
 Joseph, Schultz and Castan, supra note 3, p. 493. 
11
 Ibid., pp. 493, para. 16.28 
12
 See Concluding Observations on Lesotho, (1999) UN doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 106, para. 24; 
Concluding Observations on Poland, (1999) UN doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 110, para. 22; Concluding 
Observations on Zimbabwe, (1998) UN doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 89, para. 25. 
13
 Concluding Observations on Poland, supra note 12, para. 22. 
14
 Concluding Observations on Zimbabwe, supra note 12, para. 25. 
15
 Para. 17. 
16
 P.G. & J.H. v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 44787/98 (2001), para. 56. 
17
 Ibid. (citing additional references). 
18
 See e.g., Niemietz v. Germany, App. No. 13710/88 (1992). 
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context, which may fall within the scope of ‘private life’.”19  Inevitably, the protection of 
private life also often overlaps with the other spheres covered by Article 8—home, family 
and correspondence.20 
 
2.1.2. Justification of Interferences 
2.1.2.1. ICCPR 
 
The text of the ICCPR does not list any permissible limitations to Article 17.  Thus, a plain 
reading of the text alone suggests that only interferences which are neither unlawful nor 
arbitrary are justified. Joseph et al., however, contend that Article 17 should likely be 
understood as having limitations “very similar to the enumerated limits found in other ICCPR 
guarantees.”21  Accordingly, they suggest that measures that infringe Article 17 may be 
justified if they are “necessary in a democratic society” which entails “notions of 
reasonableness and proportionality.”22  This view accords with General Comment 16 which 
indicates that interferences authorized by law must be “reasonable in the particular 
circumstances.”23 
 
General Comment 16 also indicates that the prohibition against “unlawful” interference 
denotes that any interference must be supported by law and adds that any legal 
authorization that may exist must conform with the “provisions, aims and objectives of the 
Covenant.”24  The prohibition against “arbitrary interference”, according to the Comment, 
likewise indicates that even interference sanctioned by law must comport with the aims of 
the Covenant and be “reasonable in the particular circumstances.”25  The Comment itself 
may offer a suggestion of what “reasonable in the particular circumstances” means26: 
paragraph 7 states that state authorities should only be able to request information 
pertaining to an individual’s private life where that information “is essential in the interests 
of society as understood under the Covenant.” 
 
2.1.2.2. ECHR 
 
Article 8(2) of the ECHR provides conditions under which state interference with the right to 
respect for private life is permissible: The interference must be 1) “in accordance with the 
law”; and 2) “necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public 
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
                                                     
19
 P.G. & J.H. v. the United Kingdom, para. 56. 
20
 K. Reid, A Practitioner's Guide to the European Convention on Human Rights, 3rd edn. (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2007), p. 481 
21
 Joseph, Schultz and Castan, supra note 3, p. 483.  
22
 Ibid., p. 484. 
23
 Para. 4. 
24
 UN Human Rights Committee, supra note 4, para. 3..  It is unclear whether this latter clarification is 
meant to modify the term “unlawful” or reflects the added prohibition against arbitrary interference.  
Cf. Joseph, Schultz and Castan, supra note 3, p. 482, para. 16.11. 
25
 UN Human Rights Committee, supra note 4, para. 4. 
26
 Joseph, Schultz and Castan, supra note 3, p. 483. (also citing the HRC opinion Toonen v. Australia 
(488/92) at para. 8.3 (“The Committee interprets the requirement of reasonableness to imply that any 
interference with privacy must be proportional to the end sought and be necessary in the circumstances 
of any given case”)). 
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others.”  Thus, whenever government action that interferes with the right to respect for 
private life is challenged before the ECtHR, the Court will assess whether these two 
requirements are met.   
 
Under the first prong of this examination, the Court is interested not only in establishing 
whether the government body had legal authority under national law to take the action 
(legal basis) but also in evaluating the “quality” of that authority.27  The Court has indicated 
that this qualitative analysis includes appraising whether the law permits citizens to foresee 
under what circumstances they may become subject to government interference as well as 
the question of whether the law is generally compatible with the rule of law.28  Additionally 
the measure must pursue a legitimate aim,29 although the Court seems to treat this 
requirement as a separate one which does not belong definitively to either prong.  The 
second prong of the test has been primarily associated with proportionality—assessing 
whether the impact on human rights which the government action in question represents is 
justified in light of the aim that action seeks to achieve.  However, the Court has articulated 
different formulations of the second prong of the test.  In A, B & C v. Ireland, the test was 
articulated as the assessment of “[1] whether there existed a pressing social need for the 
measure in question and, in particular, [2] whether the interference was proportionate to 
the legitimate aim pursued, regard being had to the fair balance which has to be struck 
between the relevant competing interests in respect of which the State enjoys a margin of 
appreciation.”30  In addition, the Court may assess whether the reasons given to justify use 
of the measures are “relevant and sufficient”.31  The distinction between the two prongs, 
however, is not always clearly maintained.  In a number of cases, the Court has suggested 
that the examination of whether a measure was “necessary in a democratic society” could 
involve a qualitative assessment of relevant law.32  This circumstance indicates that the 
provision of checks against abuse and arbitrary intrusion that are provided by law play a role 
in assuring that government powers are exercised in a manner proportionate to the harms 
to which those powers are addressed. 
 
In Accordance with the Law 
 
In cases before the ECtHR that have concerned search, seizure, and surveillance, the 
conformity of the measure in question with Article 8 of the ECHR has generally hinged on 
the first factor (in accordance with the law).33  Thus, the Court concerns itself with assessing 
                                                     
27
 P.G. & J.H. v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 44787/98 (2001), para. 44. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Peck v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44647/98 (2003), paras. 64-67. 
30
 A, B & C v. Ireland, App. No. 25579/05 (2010), para. 229 (with additional citations). 
31
 See Peck, para. 76.  See also P. de Hert, “Balancing Security and Liberty Within the European 
Human Rights Framework: A Critical Reading of the Court’s Case Law in the Light of Surveillance 
and Criminal Law Enforcement Strategies After 9/11” (2005) 1, Utrecht Law Review, 68–96 at 91–2. 
32
 In the seminal case of Klass, for instance, although the Court’s discussion is couched in terms of the 
second requirement of Art. 8(2), it is concerned with examining the adequacy of the safeguards 
provided by the German surveillance law then in force.  See generally, Klass & Others v. Germany, 
App. No. 5029/71 (1978).  More recently, in the case of Aleksanyan v. Russia, the Court stated that 
“[t]o determine whether these measures were ‘necessary in a democratic society’, the Court has to 
explore the availability of effective safeguards against abuse or arbitrariness under domestic law and 
check how those safeguards operated in the specific case under examination.”  Aleksanyan v. Russia, 
App. No. 46468/06 (2008), para. 214. See also infra note 79. 
33
 Accord de Hert, supra note 31, p. 91 (“In our opinion the Strasbourg judges are too hesitant and 
reluctant to apply this check and they clearly prefer the much more secure testing of the legality 
requirement (is there a law?).”). 
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whether regulation is in place that authorizes and governs the state interference and 
whether that regulation is sufficiently definite and provides adequate safeguards.  In this 
context, the Court has expressed particular concern when authorities engage in “secret 
surveillance”.  The Court accepted in Klass, that the exercise of powers of secret surveillance 
“is, under exceptional conditions, necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security and/or for the prevention of disorder or crime.”34  There, the Court 
specifically acknowledged the “development” of terrorism in Europe as one factor that 
justified resort to such measures.  Klass, however, also made clear that “adequate and 
effective guarantees against abuse” had to be in place.35  Similarly in the Malone case, the 
Court noted that “[s]ince the implementation in practice of measures of secret surveillance 
of communications is not open to scrutiny by the individuals concerned or the public at 
large”, national law had to “indicate the scope of . . . discretion conferred on the competent 
authorities and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity, having regard to the 
legitimate aim of the measure in question, to give the individual adequate protection against 
arbitrary interference.”36  Klass provided reference to specific considerations of relevance 
for the determination of whether national law provided sufficient safeguards:  1) the nature, 
scope, and duration of possible surveillance measures; 2) the grounds on which those 
measures would be permitted; 3) the particular authorities that were given the power to 
carry out and supervise the measures; and 4) the nature of any remedies provided to the 
subjects of surveillance.37  In Kruslin and Huvig, two cases which concerned wiretapping, the 
ECtHR named specific deficiencies in the national surveillance law which indicated that the 
law could not be deemed to provide adequate protections against abuse.38  These 
deficiencies were reformulated in Weber and Saravia v. Germany and presented as 
“minimum safeguards”, indicating that they are now regarded as mandatory protective 
measures to be included in national regulation of communications surveillance.  These were:  
 
1) definition of the nature of offences for which surveillance measures are 
permitted; 
2) definition of the categories of persons who may become subject to such 
measures; 
3) limits on the duration of surveillance; 
4) procedures for examining, using, and storing data from the surveillance; 
5) the precautions to be taken when communicating data to other parties; 
6) the circumstances for the destruction of recorded information from the 
surveillance.39 
 
The Liberty case40 provides another example of legislation that was found to be inadequate.  
There, the measures implemented by the UK were found not to be in accordance with the 
law since the controlling legislation was not sufficiently precise.  The Court was also troubled 
by the wide discretion that was vested in the Secretary of State in terms of providing 
safeguards and ensuring that they were complied with.  As presented to the Court, 
authorization for surveillance required a warrant that would describe the communication 
channel to be tapped plus a certificate, which described the categories of information that 
                                                     
34
 Klass, para. 48. 
35
 Klass, para. 50. 
36
 Malone v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 8691/79 (1984), para. 68.  See also Bykov v. Russia, App. 
No. 4378/02 (2009), para. 78. 
37
 Klass, para. 50. 
38
 See Kruslin v. France, App. No. 11801/85 (1990), para. 35; Huvig v. France, App. No. 11105/84 
(1990), para. 34. 
39
 Weber & Saravia v. Germany, App. No. 54934/00 (2006), para. 95. 
40
 Liberty and Others v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 58243/00 (2008). 
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would be extracted from the intercepted communications.41  Both documents, as a rule, 
would be issued by the Secretary of State.42  Warrants permitted interception of broad 
categories of communications, e.g. all communications travelling on commercial submarine 
cables between the UK and Europe.43  The Secretary of State had the sole discretion in 
making the determination of which intercepted communications should be examined.  
Allegations presented to the Court suggested that vague criteria were used such as “all 
communications implicating national security.”44  Safeguarding of disclosure and 
reproduction of captured communications as well as observance of the certificate also fell 
solely to the Secretary of State, who was granted broad discretion to implement measures 
“as he consider[ed] necessary”.45  Lastly, whereas the German G10 law at issue in the Weber 
case contained provisions relating to procedures, in the UK, procedures were prescribed in 
internal rules and policies which were not publicly available nor produced for the Court.46  
 
Necessary in a Democratic Society 
 
Government action has been found to fail the second prong of the test in cases involving 
searches conducted by the police where the warrant obtained to authorize the search was 
deemed to be worded too vaguely.47  This put too much discretion in the hands of the 
authorities conducting the search.  In Aleksanyan v. Russia, the ECtHR provided explicit 
factors to be considered in evaluating whether a particular search met the requirement of 
necessity.  Those were: “the severity of the offence in connection with which the search and 
seizure have been effected, whether they were carried out pursuant to a warrant issued by a 
judge or a judicial officer – or subjected to after-the-fact judicial scrutiny –, whether the 
warrant was based on reasonable suspicion and whether its scope was reasonably limited”; 
“the manner in which the search was executed”; and the “the possible repercussions on the 
work and the reputation of the persons affected by the search”.48   
 
In the Weber case, the Court indicated that the examination of whether the measures were 
“necessary in a democratic society” concerned “whether the interferences in question were 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued”.49  Here, many of the same limitations and 
safeguards that were considered relevant for the examination of whether the measures 
were in accordance with the law were also considered dispositive for the question of 
necessity.  First, the Court noted that the statute only authorized strategic monitoring for a 
limited number of offences and that these offences represented “serious criminal acts”.50  
Additionally, only the President of the Federal Intelligence Service or his or her deputy could 
request such surveillance and had to submit a written application which provided the 
reasons that justified the monitoring.51  The application had to be approved by a Federal 
Minister or, as the case may be, the highest authority of the relevant regional government 
(Land) as well as a special Parliamentary Supervisory Board.52  An additional commission (the 
                                                     
41
 Ibid., para. 43. 
42
 Ibid., paras. 25 & 43. 
43
 Ibid., para. 64. 
44
 Ibid., para. 65. 
45
 Ibid., para. 66. 
46
 See ibid., paras. 66-68. 
47
 Smirnov v. Russia, App. No. 71362/01 (2007); Iliya Stefanov v. Bulgaria, App. No. 65755/01 
(2008); Aleksanyan v. Russia, App. No. 46468/06 (2008). 
48
 Aleksanyan, para. 214 (with additional citations). 
49
 Weber, para. 107. 
50
 Ibid., para. 115. 
51
 Ibid. 
52
 Ibid. 
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“G10 Commission”) had to authorize the measures either before implementation, or in 
exigent circumstances, after the fact.53  This procedure, the Court opined, “ensure[ed] that 
measures were not ordered haphazardly, irregularly or without due and proper 
consideration.”54  The Court also noted the safeguards and limitations that were imposed 
while monitoring measures were in place.  Surveillance had to cease immediately once the 
conditions required by the statute were no longer met or the measures were no longer 
necessary.55  The Court characterized the three-month limit on monitoring as “fairly short”.56  
The German Federal Constitutional Court had additionally ordered that data obtained 
through strategic monitoring be clearly marked as such and not used for any purposes other 
than those outlined in the statute.57  The statute imposed limitations on the sharing of the 
data with other authorities and imposed procedures for the retention and destruction of 
data as noted above.58  With respect to the oversight mechanisms for strategic monitoring, 
the Court took special notice of the fact that the Parliamentary Supervisory Board had to 
include members of the current opposition party and was entitled to receive periodic 
reports on ongoing surveillance measures from the Federal Minister.59  It also found that the 
G10 Commission “had substantial power in relation to all stages of interception.”60 
 
The Court also examined the sharing of data garnered from strategic surveillance as 
permitted under German law as modified by a decision of the German Federal Constitutional 
Court.  The applicants who had brought the action complained that sharing of personally 
identifiable data with other federal agencies in relation to offences specified in provision (3) 
of the G10 statute could be abused for political purposes.61  The Court, however, was 
satisfied that the conditions imposed by the German Federal Constitutional Court—that the 
data only be transmitted pursuant to the original purposes for which the data were 
collected—provided sufficient protection against abuse.62  The Court also accepted the 
German government’s argument that sharing of personally identifiable data as opposed to 
anonymized data “might prove necessary” to avert the dangers for which strategic 
monitoring had been authorized through the statute.63  One provision of the G10 statute 
permitted provision of data to the Offices for the Protection of the Constitution under 
certain circumstances.64  The decision as to whether sharing of the data under these 
circumstances was called for was taken by an officer qualified for judicial office.65  The 
offences for which such sharing was possible included less serious offences such as public 
fraud.66  The applicants complained that sharing personal data “obtained by means of a 
serious interference with the secrecy of communications to combat a multitude of 
offences—some of which were rather petty—even if they were only in the planning stage” 
violated the principle of proportionality.  The Court found that “the transmission of personal 
data obtained by general surveillance measures without any specific prior suspicion in order 
to allow the institution of criminal proceedings against those being monitored constitutes a 
fairly serious interference with the right of these persons to secrecy of 
                                                     
53
 Ibid. 
54
 Ibid.  
55
 Weber, para. 116. 
56
 Ibid. 
57
 Ibid. 
58
 Ibid.. 
59
 Ibid., para. 117. 
60
 Ibid. 
61
 Ibid., para. 120. 
62
 Ibid., paras. 121-22. 
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telecommunications.”67  However, it opined that the limitation of the use of the data to the 
more serious offences as well as the requirement that destruction of the data be recorded in 
minutes in accordance with the judgement of the Federal Constitutional Court provided an 
effective counterbalance to abuse.68 
 
Since counter-terrorism data mining does not concern communications alone, it is significant 
to note that the ECtHR has applied less stringent standards for other forms of surveillance.  
The case of Uzun v. Germany concerned the use of GPS surveillance for a period of roughly 
three months in an investigation related to a bomb attack.  Although the Court found that 
the surveillance had interfered with the applicant’s right to respect for private life, they 
ruled that the interference was justified.  The fact that the national law only permitted GPS 
surveillance when the investigation involved a criminal offence of “considerable gravity” and 
that judicial review was available after-the-fact in order to assess the proportionality of the 
measure provided sufficient safeguards against abuse, the Court determined.69  Notably, 
national law provided that the subject of surveillance was to be informed of the surveillance 
once this could be done without jeopardizing the investigation.70  Thus, it was more likely 
that wrongful or illegitimate surveillance would come under court review.  Unlike with 
telephone tapping, there was no requirement that an independent body authorize the 
measure, therefore the fact that German law provided prosecutors with the discretion to 
order GPS surveillance without a court order was not a basis for complaint under Article 8.71  
The basis for the discrepancy in treatment of GPS surveillance versus communications 
surveillance was that “GPS surveillance is by its very nature to be distinguished from other 
methods of visual or acoustical surveillance which are, as a rule, more susceptible of 
interfering with a person's right to respect for private life, because they disclose more 
information on a person's conduct, opinions or feelings.”72  Thus, the Court deemed that GPS 
tracking was not as intrusive as visual or communications surveillance and therefore did not 
require the same level of protection against abuse.  
 
2.2. Implications for Data Mining 
2.2.1. Whether There is an Interference with the Right to Privacy 
 
Data mining programmes that utilize personal data clearly represent an interference with 
the right to privacy.  The ECtHR has indicated, for instance, that any collection, storage, 
and/or processing of data pertaining to individuals represents an interference with the right 
to respect for private life.73  
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2.2.2. Whether Any Interference May Be Justified 
2.2.2.1. ICCPR 
 
Under the ICCPR, data mining programmes would have to both accord with the aims of the 
Covenant and represent a measure that was “reasonable in the particular circumstances”.  
There is also some suggestion that the HRC would require that the use of personal data 
within the scope of the programme be essential in the interests of society as understood 
under the Covenant.  As noted above, the Committee has also indicated that searches of an 
individual’s home should be “restricted to a search for necessary evidence”.  While it is 
unclear whether a similar restriction would be imposed on counter-terrorism data mining,  
the Committee’s finding does reflect a requirement that any interference must be tailored 
to the objective that the measure seeks to further.  Thus, one might derive the principle that 
the impact of a particular data mining programme on the right to privacy must be limited to 
that which is necessary to achieve the programme’s aim.  Lastly, the concluding observations 
of the Committee suggest a preference for the establishment of an independent oversight 
authority—particularly within the judiciary—over government surveillance activities.  Thus, 
the Committee might impose a warrant or similar requirement for the operation of data 
mining programmes.  Persistent data mining—that is, data mining that continued 
indefinitely—would be inconsistent with such a requirement.  Instead, use of a programme 
would have to be in response to a specific threat.  
 
2.2.2.2. ECHR 
 
According to the framework established by the ECtHR, a measure that interferes with Article  
8 of the ECHR must have a legal basis, pursue a legitimate aim, be foreseeable to those 
whose rights would be affected, and be compatible with the rule of law. In addition, the 
measure must be deemed necessary in a democratic society. This requirement may either 
entail that: 1) there be a pressing social need for the measure and that the interference was 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, regard being had to the fair balance which has 
to be struck between the relevant competing interests in which the state enjoys a margin of 
appreciation; or 2) that the reasons presented to justify the measure be “relevant and 
sufficient” and the measure be proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued.  
 
In Accordance with the Law 
 
The first prong of the ECHR test entails that data mining programmes must be explicitly 
authorized by law.  The authorization need not take the form of a statute, but the 
foreseeability requirement necessitates that it be found in a published form of regulation as 
opposed to an internal set of rules that are not accessible to the public.74  The law need not 
permit a particular individual to determine when the authorities are likely to conduct 
surveillance that will implicate his or her private life; nonetheless, “the law must be 
sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens an adequate indication as to the circumstances 
in which and the conditions on which public authorities are empowered” to use measures 
that interfere with the right to respect for private life.75  
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National law must also provide checks against abuse.  Here, there is some divergence 
between the HRC and the ECtHR.  The ECtHR has distinguished between surveillance that 
involves communications and that which does not.  Thus, its jurisprudence suggests that 
data mining that involves communications or communications data would be held to more 
stringent standards than other data mining programmes.  There is also some suggestion that 
the Court would subject programmes involving visual data to the more stringent standards.76  
This distinction reflects the fact that the Court deems communications surveillance to entail 
a higher level of intrusion than, for instance, locational tracking.  Thus, the principle of 
proportionality would suggest that higher standards must be applied where there is 
potential for a greater level of harm.  In those instances in which more stringent standards 
applied, the law would additionally need to define the “categories of persons” whose data 
might become subject to the data mining operation, impose limits on the duration of the 
programme—although a duration of three months would likely be permissible— and 
provide details pertaining to the handling of data, including the circumstances for 
destruction of that data.  In terms of the “categories of persons” who may be subjected to 
the measure, the ECtHR looks for specific language in the law that defines whether, for 
instance, only suspects of specified offences may be targeted or also accomplices, 
associates, etc.  The use of vague language in defining these classes of persons is likely to be 
found impermissible.  Additionally, whether the scope of the affected classes of persons is 
appropriate would be tested under the necessity prong.  Furthermore, any deployment of 
the data mining programme would require the prior authorization of an independent 
authority—which could, but need not necessarily take the form of a judge. 
 
Necessary in a Democratic Society 
 
The use of data mining programmes as outlined in the law must pursue a legitimate aim.  In 
light of the ECtHR’s findings in Klass, the Court would be likely to find the use of data mining 
to combat terrorism in pursuit of a legitimate aim. 
 
As noted above, the necessity requirement is essentially concerned with the question of 
proportionality.  The examination of proportionality may take on a substantive aspect or a 
procedural aspect.  In the S & Marper77 case, for instance, the Court held that the retention 
of fingerprints, cellular samples, and DNA profiles of persons who were merely suspected of 
involvement in a crime but were not convicted violated the principle of proportionality.  
Such a measure “failed to strike a fair balance between the competing public and private 
interests”.78  This represents a more substantive approach in that it assesses the actual 
interference with the rights of the applicants against the harm that the interfering measure 
is intended to address.  In other cases, the Court concentrates more on whether the existing 
procedural safeguards effectively limit the scope of interference to such an extent that a fair 
balance is struck.  In the Weber case, for example, the Court focussed on the statutory 
framework that authorized strategic monitoring to assess the legal safeguards and 
limitations on the use of the measure.  Thus, in its discussion of the necessity prong, the 
Court reviewed many of the same statutory features that it considered dispositive for the 
assessment of the qualitative requirements of the “in accordance with the law” prong.79 
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Clearly, safeguards as well as formal limitations on the scope of application of a particular 
measure can both serve to limit the impact on human rights and thus play a role in 
maintaining proportionality.  Thus, procedures which require government agents to 
articulate the need for the use of a particular measure and impose review by a supervising 
authority or a judge before final authorization is granted serve to prevent the occurrence of 
interferences with human rights without a showing of the appropriate level of justification.  
Similarly, the limitation of measures to serious offences can ensure that the level of 
potential harm in terms of human rights only occurs where the gravity of the situation 
requires it.  The imposition of default time limits also places a barrier on initial harm and 
provides an opportunity for review of the results of the measure to determine if longer 
resort to its use is justified.  Nonetheless, the question arises as to whether the Court would 
find no violation on the basis of the provision of such procedural safeguards where the 
human rights impact in terms of the number of individuals whose right to respect for private 
life had been interfered with could be shown to be on a massive scale.  In this regard, the 
Weber and Liberty cases are of particular interest. 
 
Both the Weber and Liberty cases concerned broad surveillance in the form of signals 
intelligence—in the case of Liberty, the alleged interception of telephone, facsimile, and e-
mail communications between Ireland and the UK by the UK Ministry of Defence and in 
Weber and Saravia, the performance of “strategic monitoring” by the German Federal 
Intelligence Service to avert “serious dangers” to national security. In Liberty, the applicants 
alleged that, upon issuance of warrants, the UK government was capturing all 
communications that were sent along a particular channel and then used a search engine to 
“filter” out those communications that were likely to be of most interest.80  It is unclear 
whether the German measures represented the same scale and form of surveillance.  Weber 
indicated that the surveillance in question did not concern monitoring of a particular 
individual81 and involved “monitoring” and “recording” of communications.82  The German 
legislation (the so-called “G10 Act”) also contained provisions governing the use of 
“catchwords”83 which could serve the same function as the search engine-driven “filtering” 
referred to in Liberty.  Additionally, neither the G10 Act nor Weber indicates whether the 
catchwords were applied before or after communications had been recorded.  In any event, 
even in the most favourable scenario, there would seem to be some risk that 
communications that did not meet the purpose of the exercise would be intercepted 
through the use of catchwords. 
 
It is also unclear whether either of the measures in the two cases actually entailed the use of 
data mining.  Neither case explicitly used the term “data mining” but conceivably data 
mining could be used to perform the sort of filtering function described.  Regardless of 
whether data mining was used, the type of catchword-assisted surveillance reflected in the 
cases represents an analogous phenomenon. Therefore, the cases provide the most relevant 
insight into how the Court might deal with data mining, for instance in a profiling manner. 
 
Despite the fact that similar forms of surveillance were at issue in the two cases, the Court 
found a violation of Article 8 in Liberty but no violation in Weber.  The determining factor 
was the fact that the German legislation provided safeguards and limitations that the Court 
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found to be adequate for purposes of Article 8(2), whereas the surveillance regime 
permitted under UK law was found to be wanting in this respect.  Yet, both cases concerned 
very broad forms of surveillance.  The G10, however, appeared to limit the measure to 
actual, specific threats, whereas the UK measures seemed more open-ended.  On the other 
hand, the applicants in Weber complained that under the revised version of the G10, there 
were “no longer” any geographic restrictions on the use of such monitoring,84 suggesting 
that strategic monitoring could involve tapping communications throughout the world.  In 
contrast, the practice of the UK as presented to the Court in Liberty focussed on a particular 
channel of communication which was geographically limited, although there was nothing to 
suggest that the UK warrant system might not name multiple communication channels to 
extend the geographic scope of surveillance. 
 
The full implications of Weber are therefore not entirely clear.  One possibility is that the 
Court was cognizant of the broad scale of interference that strategic monitoring could 
represent, but found that the “pressing need” for which such measures were implemented 
was so dire that such interference was justified.  Additionally, a generous margin of 
appreciation in matters of national security may also have entered in to the Court’s calculus.  
On the other hand, the case might have had a different result if the Court had been 
presented with hard figures in terms of the number of individuals whose communications 
had been subjected to the monitoring.  Complainants, however, will generally find it difficult 
to obtain such hard numbers where “secret surveillance” measures are concerned.   
 
Furthermore, assessing the seriousness of an interference with the right to respect for 
private life may not be straightforward. Some may argue that examination of 
communications or abstracts of communications by machines is a relatively minor 
interference compared to a situation where communications are read by human eyes or 
listened to by human ears.  As we noted in Deliverable 8.2, the same argument may be 
made with respect to data mining.85  Thus, some would argue that the fact that data 
pertaining to hundreds, thousands, or millions of individuals are subjected to a particular 
data mining programme,86 potentially on a repeated basis, means that there is a serious 
interference with Article 8 of the ECHR.  On the other hand, others may argue that where 
such large amounts of data are, in most cases, only scrutinized by machines but not human 
beings, the interference is not particularly serious.  There will be more to say on this issue 
with regard to the subject of data protection, but the massive scale that is often associated 
with data mining as well as signals intelligence presents a particularly critical factor for the 
question of proportionality in privacy law.   
 
In addition to the scale of impact of the measure on human rights, there is also the question 
of effectiveness.  In Deliverable 8.2, we suggested that the actual effectiveness of a measure 
should also play a role in proportionality analysis.87  Effectiveness or “suitability” is a 
recognized element of proportionality analysis under the national law of some European 
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states and in the jurisprudence of the ECJ.  However, effectiveness or suitability in the legal 
sense appears to be a very low hurdle, which does not seek to assess the actual 
effectiveness of a measure in achieving its intended aim, but rather tests to ensure that a 
measure is not wholly unsuited on its face.88  Thus, if the measure could conceivably further 
the achievement of the goal in any way, it would seem to generally meet the effectiveness 
requirement.89  The consideration of actual effectiveness may rather fall under the legal 
concept of necessity and has appeared in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.90  A measure 
which interferes with the right to respect for private life but which accomplishes little cannot 
be considered “necessary” in any sense for the achievement of the intended aim. 
 
Tied to the concept of necessity in proportionality analysis is the principle which is often 
referred to as “subsidiarity”.  Subsidiarity requires that, whenever measures will impact 
human rights, governments adopt the least intrusive measures available to achieve the 
particular objective sought.  This requirement has been applied by the ECtHR in 
proportionality analysis.91  As we suggested in D8.2, less intrusive means of combating 
terrorism than large-scale data mining programmes, including more limited applications of 
data mining, may not only suffice to achieve the objective of countering terrorism but may 
also be more effective. 
 
Thus, for a number of reasons, large-scale counter-terrorism data mining programmes are 
unlikely to meet the requirement of proportionality.   Such data mining programmes could 
not be regarded as “necessary in a democratic society” for the prevention of terrorism. 
 
3. Data Protection 
 
Data protection law represents a subset of privacy law that concerns the handling of 
personal data.  It seeks to ensure that privacy is protected in the processing of data relating 
to individuals, and is reflected in a number of instruments at both the European and 
international level.   
 
The most important instrument at the international level is the OECD Guidelines on the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data.  As the title “Guidelines” 
suggests, the language of the instrument is aspirational and does not represent a legally 
binding instrument. 
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At the European level, the most relevant instrument is the Council of Europe’s Convention 
for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data.  
Although it provides similar protections as those included in the OECD Guidelines, as the title 
of the Convention implies, it relates specifically to personal data that is subject to automatic 
processing and is thus narrower in scope.  The Convention, however, provides the possibility 
for member states to declare that they will apply the Convention also to the handling of 
personal data that does not involve automatic processing.92  “Automatic processing” is 
defined in the Convention as the “storage of data, carrying out of logical and/or arithmetical 
operations on those data, their alteration, erasure, retrieval or dissemination” where those 
operations are carried out in any part through automated means.93  The Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe also adopted a resolution in 1987 which provides data 
protection principles for the automated use, handling, and processing of personal data 
within the police sector.94 
 
At the level of the European Union, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union establishes a right to the protection of personal data in Article 8.  This article provides 
that personal data may only be processed with the consent of the data subject or where 
legitimately authorized by law.95  Additionally, the processing must be done “fairly” and for a 
specified purpose.96  Article 8 also establishes that every person has the right to have access 
to personal data that pertains to him or her and to have that data corrected.97  Lastly, it 
requires that member states have a national authority to ensure compliance with Article 8. 
The quintessential law for data protection within the European Union is the EU Data 
Protection Directive.98  The directive represents the effort to establish a harmonized regime 
of minimum standards of data protection throughout the Union.  It draws upon principles 
established in the OECD Guidelines and the Council of Europe Convention and shares many 
similarities with the Convention in particular.  Also of relevance for counter-terrorism data 
mining is the Council Framework Decision of 27 November 2008 on the protection of 
personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters.99  The Framework Decision applies to personal data transferred between or among 
member states or to non-member states for law enforcement purposes and includes 
coverage of data made available to information systems established on the basis of Title VI 
of the Treaty on European Union.100  Like the Directive, the Framework Decision applies both 
to automated processing and non-automated processing.101 
 
The jurisprudence of the ECtHR on the right to respect for private life also reflects data 
protection principles in that it incorporates them into this right.  There is thus some 
evidence that actions that violate data protection principles will be held to represent an 
interference with Article 8 of the ECHR.  The case of S & Marper v. UK, for instance, made 
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numerous citations to the Council of Europe’s Data Protection Convention,102 indicating that 
the Court will also enforce that Convention through the ECHR.  In that case, the Court stated 
that the “mere storing of data relating to the private life of an individual amounts to an 
interference within the meaning of Article 8”103 and that “protection of personal data is of 
fundamental importance to a person's enjoyment of his or her right to respect for private 
and family life, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention.”104  A number of cases have 
also found the collection and storage of personal data on the part of law enforcement or 
national security services to constitute an interference with Article 8.105  As noted above, 
issues pertaining to the retention, handling, sharing, and destruction of data as well as the 
provision of notice to affected data subjects were significant considerations in the Weber 
and Liberty cases. 
 
As noted above the ECtHR has indicated that it may refer to the Convention on Automated 
Processing in the application of Article 8 of the ECHR.  Thus, the Court may interpret an 
interference with data protection rights under that Convention as an indication of an 
interference with the right to respect for private life under Article 8 of the ECHR.  This would 
implicate data mining that involves the processing of data that pertains to an identified or 
identifiable individual. 
 
3.1. Exceptions and Derogations 
 
A central issue for the relevance of data protection law for counter-terrorism data mining is 
the inclusion within international instruments of opportunities for states to derogate from 
provisions of the respective instrument, particularly with regard to matters of national 
security and/or criminal law enforcement, as well as the outright exclusion of the 
instrument’s application in the areas of national security, intelligence, or criminal law 
enforcement.   
 
The OECD Guidelines, for instance, appear to permit exceptions to the principles or to the 
promotion of the free flow of data in paragraph 4.  However, such exceptions “including 
those relating to national sovereignty, national security and public policy” should be “as few 
as possible” and “made known to the public”.   
 
The Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data permits member states to derogate from the 
provisions pertaining to data quality, special categories of data, and the right to request 
information or seek rectification of data. In order to do so, however, the derogation must be 
“provided for by the law of the Party” and represent “a necessary measure in a democratic 
society in the interests of... protecting State security, public safety, the monetary interests of 
the State or the suppression of criminal offences” or “protecting the data subject or the 
rights and freedoms of others.”106  Member states may, at any time, also exclude certain 
categories of data from the application of the Convention by making a declaration to the 
Secretary General of the Council of Europe and depositing a list of the categories to be 
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excluded.107  Some member states have made declarations under this provision that exclude 
the processing of data for purposes of law enforcement or national security.108 
 
Article 3(2) of the EU Data Protection Directive provides that the Directive shall not apply “to 
processing operations concerning public security, defence, State security, and the activities 
of the State in areas of criminal law”.  Article 13 also permits member states to enact 
additional exemptions to the application of the Directive for purposes of national and public 
security, defence, and criminal law enforcement and ethics enforcement for regulated 
professions.  These provisions thus allow member states to exclude data mining done in the 
name of counter-terrorism from the scope of national data protection law and make 
additional adjustments to that law to accommodate counter-terrorism programmes.    
 
The Framework Decision on police and judicial cooperation also appears to hold some 
forbearance with respect to its application in areas touching upon national security.  Article 
1(4) states that the Framework Decision “is without prejudice to essential national security 
interests and specific intelligence activities in the field of national security.” 
 
As noted above, the EU Data Protection Directive provides EU member states with leeway to 
exempt counter-terrorism activities from data protection since these would fall squarely 
within the realm of national security, and the EU Framework Decision appears to extend a 
similar level of discretion at least insofar as the activities fall within the realm of national 
security measures as opposed to standard law enforcement measures.  The Council of 
Europe’s Convention on Automated Processing also permits signatories to derogate from 
most of the substantive protections provided in the Convention so long as it is “provided for 
by the law of the Party” and represents “a necessary measure in a democratic society in the 
interests of... protecting State security”.  The latter issue would probably be resolved along 
the lines of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.  Thus, the derogating state would have to be 
able to show that there is “a pressing social need” and that any interference that results is 
proportionate to the aim pursued.  The need for efficiency in counter-terrorism activities is 
likely to be viewed as a pressing social need that would justify derogation from the 
Convention.  Whether the derogation is proportionate, however, would depend upon its 
exact scope.  Even if the derogation was limited to counter-terrorism data mining activities, 
this might not meet the proportionality requirement due to the often overbroad impact of 
data mining. In any event, Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as well as the 
soft principles of the OECD Guidelines would still apply in addition to any data protection 
principles that form an integral part of Article 8 of the ECHR.  Article 8 of the Charter is also 
subject to limitation.  Article 52 of the Charter states that limitations of any of the rights of 
the Charter must be provided by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms.  
Additionally, they must be “necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest 
recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others”, 
“[s]ubject to the principle of proportionality”. 
 
 
3.2. Basic Principles 
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The OECD Guidelines establish eight basic principles of data protection which are also 
reflected in the legal instruments at the European level. These are 1) collection limitation, 2) 
data quality, 3) purpose specification, 4) use limitation, 5) security safeguards, 6) openness, 
7) individual participation, and 8) accountability.  Additionally, the Guidelines introduce 
three central concepts for the regulation of data protection, namely that of the “data 
controller”, “personal data” and the “data subject”.  A “data controller” as defined by the 
Guidelines is an authority established under national law who determines the content and 
use of a collection of data.  A data controller need not actually be involved with the 
collection, storage, and processing of the data.109  “Personal data” is defined as “any 
information relating to an identified or identifiable individual”.110  A “data subject” is the 
individual to whom data (the personal data) in a collection pertain.111  The following sections 
discuss in further detail the data protection principles. 
3.2.1. Collection Limitation 
 
The collection limitation principle establishes that there “should be limits to the collection of 
personal data” and that the collection of data should take place through lawful and fair 
means and “where appropriate with the knowledge or consent of the data subject.”112  The 
EU Data Protection Directive includes collection within the meaning of “processing”.113  
Therefore, all limitations that apply to processing under the Directive would also apply to 
collection. 
 
The collection limitation principle may have direct implications for counter-terrorism data 
mining in two ways.  First, where data mining programmes perform aggregating functions or 
pull data from sources that are not under the direct control of the data controller, these 
programmes may be seen as performing data collection.  Second, if one adopts a broad 
definition of the term “collection”, data mining programmes that in the course of their 
operation copy or store data in new locations may also be viewed as “collecting” data.  Even 
apart from these considerations, the limitation of collection is an issue of at least indirect 
consequence for data mining since many programmes will rely on databases that are either 
created and maintained to support the programme or were initially created for some other 
purpose.   
 
The language of the principle that there “should be limits” implies that any collection of data 
should not go beyond what is necessary for the effective operation of the programme.  Data 
collection should not be done in any manner which would violate existing law, including 
applicable provisions of the Convention on Automatic Processing as well as the ECHR.  The 
notion that collection should be carried out through “fair means”, coupled with the 
openness and purpose specification principles (discussed below), suggest at a minimum that 
individuals should be informed that their data is being collected for use in a particular 
programme.  Given that data collection represents the point of departure from which future 
infringements of human rights may follow, observation of the collection limitation principle 
is a critical means for limiting the impact of governmental data processing activities.   
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3.2.2. Data Quality 
 
Data quality as defined in the OECD Guidelines stands for the principle that any personal 
data processed should be relevant to the intended use and be accurate, complete, and up-
to-date “to the extent necessary” for the intended use.114  Both the Council of Europe’s 
Convention on Automatic Processing and the EU Data Protection Directive similarly provide 
that personal data that is subjected to automatic processing must be “accurate, and, where 
necessary, kept up to date.”115  The Directive additionally imposes the obligation that states 
take “every reasonable step” to ensure that inaccurate or incomplete data are erased or 
corrected.116  The Framework Decision on police and judicial cooperation obligates relevant 
authorities to correct inaccurate data and complete or update data where possible and 
necessary.117  These authorities must also verify the accuracy of data before transmitting or 
making it available to their counterparts in other member states.118  If it becomes known 
after the fact that data sent or made available to other authorities is inaccurate, the 
receiving authorities must be informed “without delay”.119  The Framework Decision also 
imposes the obligation upon recipient authorities to correct, delete, or otherwise limit the 
further processing of such data.120   
 
The issue of data quality and the problems it can produce for data mining was discussed in 
D8.2.  There, we pointed out how data quality issues can hamper the effectiveness of a 
programme and lead to human rights violations through the occurrence of false positives.  
Apart from these considerations, the data quality principle provides independent grounds 
for ensuring the accuracy of data that is used for data mining purposes, which in some 
instances will rise to the level of an obligation.  The Convention on Automatic Processing 
permits states to derogate from its data quality provisions for state security purposes,121 
which may also be applicable to counter-terrorism data mining.  However, any derogation 
would be subject to the principle of necessity.  Thus, governments would have to be able to 
demonstrate that application of the data quality provisions under Article 5 would hamper 
efforts to ensure state security.  However, as revealed in D8.2, it is the failure to ensure data 
quality, rather than enforcement of data quality, which will normally hamper state security 
efforts.  There may be instances in which the exigency of the situation would render quality 
control impractical.  Such situations, however, might qualify as a state of emergency in 
which limited exception to human rights obligations would be permissible but only for the 
duration of the emergency.122  They would not provide grounds for a general derogation. 
 
3.2.3. Purpose Specification 
 
Purpose specification means that the purposes for which the data are to be used should be 
disclosed by the time of collection of the data.  It also entails that any use or subsequent use 
of that data should remain tied to that purpose or purposes or “such others as are not 
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incompatible with those purposes”.123  Any alteration of purpose should be notified.  This 
principle is also reflected in the European Charter which requires that processing be done 
“fairly” and for a specified purpose.124  The Council of Europe’s Convention on Automatic 
Processing incorporates the purpose specification principle in Article 5, which provides that 
any personal data that is subjected to automatic processing must be “stored for specified 
and legitimate purposes and not used in a way incompatible with those purposes”.125  The 
EU Framework Decision also imposes the purpose specification requirement in the context 
of data transferred between law enforcement or judicial authorities.  Article 3(1) of that 
instrument provides that “[p]ersonal data may be collected by the competent authorities 
only for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes in the framework of their tasks and may 
be processed only for the same purpose for which data were collected.”  The provision 
further requires that any processing be “lawful and adequate, relevant and not excessive in 
relation to the purposes for which they are collected.” 
 
Purpose specification is a particularly salient issue for counter-terrorism data mining since 
the purpose of such programmes is often ill-defined.  In some instances, the programme 
may take the form of a research or investigatory tool rather than a programme with a single, 
well-defined objective.  Additionally, data mining programmes are sometimes designed to 
make use of pre-existing databases which may have been established for different purposes.  
The purpose specification principle requires that any such change in the objectives for which 
personal data are used must be announced through some form of public notice, particularly 
when the new purpose is one which is “incompatible” with the previously given purpose.  
The use of databases established for criminal law enforcement purposes in counter-
terrorism data mining may be considered compatible purposes.  However, the use of 
databases that were established for purposes not related to criminal law enforcement, such 
as residential registries, driver registries, or tax registries would not be compatible with 
counter-terrorism.126  The purpose specification principle of the Convention on Automatic 
Processing is contained in a derogable provision, and governments may wish to derogate in 
this respect with regards to counter-terrorism data mining in order to provide more 
flexibility.  Again, such derogation would only be permissible to the extent necessary.  Thus, 
states would have to show that complying with the purpose specification requirement of the 
Convention would hinder their counter-terrorism efforts.  Furthermore, the purpose 
specification requirement of the EU Charter would still apply, subject to permissible 
limitations.  Thus, the Charter would require that states explicitly define the purpose of any 
data mining programme that makes use of personal data unless they could demonstrate that 
it was necessary to refrain from doing so and that this was consonant with the principle of 
proportionality and was genuinely effective. 
 
3.2.4. Use Limitation 
 
The use limitation principle of the OECD Guidelines establishes that personal data should not 
“be disclosed, made available or otherwise used” for any purpose other than that specified 
unless the data subject gives consent or it is authorized by law.127  As such it goes hand-in-
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hand with the purpose specification principle and is reflected in the EU Charter, the Council 
of Europe’s Convention on Automatic Processing and the EU Framework Decision as 
described above.   
 
3.2.5. Security Safeguards 
 
The security safeguards principle of the OECD Guidelines establishes that personal data 
should be secured against “loss or unauthorised access, destruction, use, modification or 
disclosure” or other such risks.128  This principle is also reflected in Article 7 of the Council of 
Europe’s Convention on Automatic Processing which requires that “[a]ppropriate security 
measures” be taken against the “accidental or unauthorised destruction or accidental loss as 
well as against unauthorised access, alteration or dissemination” of personal data stored in 
automated data files.  The Convention on Automated Processing additionally requires the 
establishment of “appropriate safeguards” in national law for the automated processing of 
sensitive data.129  The EU Framework Decision also applies this requirement to sensitive data 
when transferred between authorities in different states.130  
 
The OECD Guidelines and the Council of Europe’s Convention appear to speak primarily to 
the establishment of technological safeguards and system security whereas the provisions 
on the protection of sensitive data in the Convention and Framework Decision refer to the 
creation of legal safeguards.  Ideally, both kinds of safeguards should be in place to secure 
the “physical” integrity of data as well as to ensure that those handling such data do so in a 
manner that does not compromise the use of that data or expose it to the risk of 
unauthorized use.   
 
The creation of safeguards against loss, destruction, or modification of data reinforces the 
principle of data quality since such events can prevent the proper or effective operation of 
data mining operations that rely on that data.  The requirement to provide security against 
unauthorized access and dissemination not only calls for the implementation of robust 
access controls in connection with the information systems that provide access to users, but 
also for the limitation of access to reduce the risk of unauthorized dissemination.  Moreover, 
security measures should not only address the risk of unauthorized access but also of misuse 
of data on the part of those who have authorized access.  A system which automatically 
creates logs of users’ use of the system provides the opportunity for audits—whether 
manual or automated—to assess whether the system has been misused or compromised.  
Although the provision pertaining to sensitive data in the Council of Europe’s Convention is 
derogable, Article 7, pertaining to security measures in general, is not.  
 
3.2.6. Openness 
 
The openness principle provided by the OECD Guidelines calls for “a general policy” of 
transparency with respect to “developments, practices and policies” pertaining to personal 
data.131   Furthermore, according to this principle, individuals should be enabled to 
determine the existence and nature of a collection of personal data, the purposes of their 
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use, as well as the identity and “usual residence” of the responsible data controller.  
Similarly, the Council of Europe’s Convention on Automatic Processing requires states to 
ensure that the existence of a collection of data that is subject to automatic processing, its 
“main purposes”, and the identity and address of the respective data controller are all 
ascertainable by any person.132   
 
The openness principle reinforces the purpose specification requirement in that it calls on 
states to reveal the purpose of a particular data processing operation or collection of data.  
Additionally, information pertaining to changes in the purpose or use of such an operation 
or data collection should also be available to the public.  In order to meet obligations under 
the Convention, states might, at a minimum, announce details concerning data mining 
programmes in a government bulletin.133  However, providing information through media 
which individuals, particularly in the case of non-citizens, are more likely to encounter or 
refer to when confronted with the activities of particular agencies that are engaged in 
counter-terrorism data mining—such as agency websites or pamphlets or notices that are 
provided at data collection points (border checks, airports, banks or money order 
businesses) or the public areas of agency offices— might prove more effective.   
 
3.2.7. Individual Participation 
 
The individual participation principle of the OECD Guidelines calls for the recognition of a 
number of rights for data subjects.  First, each data subject has the right to request his or her 
data from a data controller or otherwise to confirm whether the data controller holds data 
relating to him or her.  Second, that data should be provided to the data subject in an 
intelligible form, within a reasonable time, in a reasonable manner, and at no excessive cost.  
Third, in the event that a request for information is denied, the data subject should have the 
right to receive notice of the grounds for that denial and the opportunity to challenge that 
denial.  Fourth, the data subject should have the right to challenge data pertaining to him or 
her and have that data erased, corrected, completed, or amended.134  The Council of Europe 
Convention confers similar rights under Article 8, whereas the EU Charter merely provides 
the right to have access to one’s own personal data that pertain to him or her and to have 
that data corrected.135   
 
The observance of these rights would likely prove controversial in many instances, since 
states may be reluctant even to divulge what data is being utilized in data mining 
programmes for fear that it will aid circumvention of the programme, let alone provide 
evidence of a potential instance of wrongdoing.  States may derogate from the provision of 
these rights under the Council of Europe Convention, subject to the principle of necessity.  
Similarly, the more basic EU Charter rights could only be limited to the extent such 
limitations are “necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by 
the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others”, “[s]ubject to the 
principle of proportionality”.136  Again, the aim of protecting national security is likely to be 
viewed as a legitimate objective.  However, it seems less likely that the principle of 
proportionality would permit the outright denial of the right to access and correction for all 
                                                     
132
 Art. 8. 
133
 Compare Detailed Comments to the OECD Guidelines, Paragraph 12, ¶ 57.  
134
 Para. 13. 
135
 Art. 8(2). 
136
 Art. 52. 
  25 
time.  Knowledge of the type of data that is subjected to data mining seems too trivial when 
weighed against the possibility of circumvention.  
 
There is the very real possibility that the revelation of information to individuals will 
undermine the purpose of a given data mining operation or ongoing investigations.  
Limitation of the rights described above in such instances may, in the case of the EU Charter, 
be necessary to meet an objective of general interest and thus be permissible.  Where 
ongoing investigations are no longer endangered, the limitation would no longer be 
permissible and full observance of the rights would have to be restored.  States could also 
derogate from granting Article 8 rights under the Council of Europe Convention, but the 
principle of necessity would require the derogation to be limited to denials which are truly 
required for the protection of state security, public safety or the execution of criminal law 
enforcement. 
 
3.2.8. Accountability 
 
Lastly, the accountability principle entails that data controllers should be held accountable 
for observing the principles of the OECD Guidelines.137  The Council of Europe Convention 
provides measures for accountability by requiring state parties to provide “appropriate 
sanctions and remedies for violations of provisions of domestic law giving effect to the basic 
principles for data protection” represented in Articles 5 through 8.138  Article 8 additionally 
requires states to provide a remedy for individuals where the individual’s request for 
information on, copies, correction, or erasure of personal data has not been complied 
with.139  The EU Charter ensures accountability by requiring that member states have an 
independent authority to ensure compliance with Article 8. 
 
States may comply with Article 8 of the EU Charter by assigning oversight of the observance 
of data protection rights with respect to counter-terrorism data mining to the national data 
protection supervisor or equivalent authority.  However, in order to avoid overburdening the 
data protection authority or in light of the particularly sensitive nature of counter-terrorism 
activities, states may choose to assign these duties to a different authority.  Particularly 
where a significantly different body of national data protection law applies to counter-
terrorism activities, the establishment of a separate body may be appropriate.  This 
authority, however, as the Charter clearly establishes, must be truly independent.  The 
provision of remedies to individuals as provided in the Council of Europe Convention may be 
limited to the extent that states may permissibly derogate from Article 8 or Articles 5 or 6.  
However, at the very least, states would still need to have a system of sanctions in place for 
violations of applicable substantive provisions as well as appropriate measures for 
remedying violations of data security under Article 7. 
 
3.3. Additional Requirements 
3.3.1. Permitted Processing  
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Data protection instruments also define boundaries within which processing of personal 
data may take place.  The EU Charter establishes that personal data may only be processed 
with the consent of the data subject or where legitimately authorized by law.140  Processing 
must also be done fairly and lawfully as provided by both the Charter and the Council of 
Europe Convention.141  In addition to consent, which must be given unambiguously, the EU 
Data Protection Directive outlines the instances in which processing may be authorized by 
law within the European Union: 1) where the processing is necessary in connection with a 
contract to which the data subject is a party or wishes to enter into; 2) where the processing 
is necessary to comply with a legal obligation; 3) where the processing is necessary to 
protect a vital interest of the data subject; 4) where the processing is necessary as a matter 
of public interest or to perform an official function; or 5) where the processing is necessary 
for the pursuit of the data controller’s “legitimate interests” except where overridden by the 
interests of the data subject’s fundamental rights and freedoms.142   
 
Although the requirements of the EU Data Protection Directive may not apply in the area of 
counter-terrorism data mining regardless of whether it falls within the realm of law 
enforcement or national security, they nonetheless serve as an indication that the spirit of 
data protection law stands for the principle that processing of personal data be limited by 
certain conditions.  An additionally significant aspect of data protection law is the fact that 
there is no harm requirement.  The act of processing personal data in an impermissible 
manner as such represents a violation of data protection law.  This aspect is particularly 
relevant for data mining, since the vast majority of individuals whose data is subjected to 
data mining will not experience any harm in the form of enhanced scrutiny from law 
enforcement or intelligence officials.   
 
Even where national law implementing the EU Data Protection Directive does not apply to 
counter-terrorism data mining, the EU Charter and potentially the Council of Europe 
Convention would still require that such data mining be done in a fair and lawful manner.  
“Lawful” requires not only that the programme conform to relevant legal requirements but 
also that adequate legal regulation be in place to govern the use of the programme.  
Additionally, the processing accomplished by the programme would have to be done 
“fairly”.  It is not entirely clear what this requirement entails, however, it might mean that 
the soundness of the programme would have to be demonstrated. 
3.3.2. Transfer of Data  
 
Several instruments contain provisions governing the transfer of personal data across 
borders.  The relevant provisions of the OECD Guidelines, in a sense, stand as a kind of 
counterpoint to the basic principles in that they generally promote the free flow of data 
internationally.  Paragraph 18, for instance, states that “Member countries should avoid 
developing laws, policies and practices in the name of the protection of privacy and 
individual liberties, which would create obstacles to transborder flows of personal data that 
would exceed requirements for such protection.”  However, member countries may refuse 
to allow the transborder transfer of data when the receiving state does not “substantially 
observe” the Guidelines or where the further transfer of the data would result in the 
circumvention of the member country's domestic privacy law. 
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Similar to the Guidelines, the Council of Europe Convention on Automatic Processing 
generally promotes the free flow of data across national borders.  Article 12 provides that 
the transfer of personal data transnationally should not be prohibited or subjected to special 
authorization solely for the purpose of protecting privacy.143  However, it permits parties to 
derogate from this provision insofar as national legislation provides enhanced protection for 
special categories of data which are not provided in the national legislation of the receiving 
party.144  Additionally, derogation is permitted in order to prevent circumvention of the 
Convention where personal data would be transferred to a state that is not a party to the 
Convention via a party that is acting as an intermediary.145 
 
The EU Data Protection Directive also contains provisions relating to the transfer of personal 
data outside of the EU.  Such transfers may only be allowed when the receiving country 
provides an “adequate level of protection.”146  However, derogation from this rule is 
permitted under the same conditions which govern processing generally under Article 7.147 
 
The EU Framework Decision includes the right of the data subject to receive information as 
to whether his or her personal data has been transferred to another state.148  Receiving 
states, however, may request that the data subject not be informed of its receipt of his or 
her personal data without that state’s prior consent.  Additionally, member states may 
adopt legislative measures to permit the refusal to provide information where that is a 
necessary and proportionate measure to prevent the obstruction of legal procedures, to 
prevent interference with the investigation or prosecution of criminal offences, to protect 
public or national security, or to protect the data subject or the rights and freedoms of 
others.149   
 
Article 10 of the Framework Decision requires that all transfers of personal data for law 
enforcement purposes be logged for legal compliance and quality control purposes.  The 
Framework Decision also requires that transfer of personal data to non-member states may 
only take place where: 
“(a) it is necessary for the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of 
criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties; 
(b) the receiving authority in the third State or receiving international body is 
responsible for the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal 
offences or the execution of criminal penalties; 
(c) the Member State from which the data were obtained has given its consent to 
transfer in compliance with its national law; and 
(d) the third State or international body concerned ensures an adequate level of 
protection for the intended data processing.”150 
However transfer to countries that do not offer an “adequate level of protection” may 
nonetheless take place where:  
“(a) the national law of the Member State transferring the data so provides because 
of: 
(i) legitimate specific interests of the data subject; or 
(ii) legitimate prevailing interests, especially important public interests; or 
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(b) the third State or receiving international body provides safeguards which are 
deemed adequate by the Member State concerned according to its national law.”151 
 
Instances in which data mining programmes rely on data located in databases in foreign 
countries will be rare if they occur at all.  However, there is likely to be interest in feeding 
data obtained from foreign authorities, or in some instances, private parties into local 
databases that support data mining operations.  The OECD Guidelines and the Council of 
Europe Convention on Automatic Processing allow such transfers but permit states to deny 
transfer when the receiving party does not provide a comparable level of data protection.  
With the exception of purely intelligence-related work or emergencies, the EU Framework 
Decision will likely apply to the international transfer of data for data mining purposes.  
Thus, states would have to ensure that logs of the data transferred are maintained and that 
the rights of data subjects to receive information as to whether their personal data has been 
transferred to another country are observed, except where refusal to provide such 
information is a necessary and proportionate means of protecting national security, ongoing 
legal proceedings or criminal investigations, or the rights and interests of the data subject or 
others.  Transfers to non-EU countries would only be permissible under the conditions 
outlined in Article 13(1), including, in particular, the requirement that the state in which the 
receiving party is located has comparable data protection law in place.  Exceptions would 
only be permitted to protect the rights of the data subject, where overriding public interest 
considerations made the transfer necessary, or where the state for which the receiving party 
is acting provided other safeguards which represented an appropriate substitute for the lack 
of national data protection law. 
 
3.3.3. Sensitive Data  
 
One of the features that distinguishes the Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection 
of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data from the OECD 
Guidelines is its creation of “special categories” of data.  These are data that reveal “racial 
origin, political opinions or religious or other beliefs” or concern “health or sexual life” or 
criminal convictions.  According to the Convention, these types of data may not be subjected 
to automatic processing unless the member state provides “appropriate safeguards” within 
national law.152 The EU Data Protection Directive also establishes a number of bases for 
processing sensitive data—i.e. the special categories of data—without the subject's consent 
that are not found in the Convention.153  Also unlike the Convention, the Directive requires 
that the processing of sensitive data otherwise be prohibited by law.154  The EU Framework 
Decision only permits the transfer of sensitive data among police and judicial authorities in 
different states where it is “strictly necessary.”155 
 
The issue of handling sensitive data is likely to arise in the context of counter-terrorism data 
mining since such programmes may make use of sensitive data, such as race or national 
origin, religious or political beliefs.  The state would have to ensure that such data is 
protected by “appropriate safeguards”.  This requirement implies that states need to 
provide a higher level of protection for sensitive data than is the case for other types of 
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personal data.  Sensitive data that is transferred internationally within the context of judicial 
cooperation can only take place where it constitutes a necessary measure. 
 
3.3.4. Automated Decisions  
 
Another notable feature of the EU Data Protection Directive with relevance for data mining 
is Article 15, which concerns “automated decisions”.  Article 15 mandates that member 
states must provide all persons with the right to be free from any decision that “produces 
legal effects concerning him or significantly affects him and which is based solely on 
automated processing of data intended to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to 
him”.156  However, the Article also permits a broad exception where such automated 
decision-making “is authorized by a law which also lays down measures to safeguard the 
data subject's legitimate interests.”157  Yet, should such automated decisions be 
implemented, Article 13 requires that any data subject whose data is subjected to such 
decisions be given the right to obtain “knowledge of the logic involved in any automatic 
processing of data concerning him”.  
 
The EU Framework Decision also addresses automated decisions in Article 7.  This article 
provides that automated decisions that have adverse legal effects for the data subject or 
significantly affects him must have a basis in national law.  Additionally, the law must 
provide safeguards to protect the data subject’s legitimate interests. 
 
Data mining represents an automated process and if data mining is used as the sole basis of 
an administrative action that affects the rights of individuals, aspects of data protection law 
relating to automated decisions are implicated to the extent applicable.  The EU Framework 
Decision applies to international transfers of data that fall within the realm of law 
enforcement as opposed to national security intelligence. Thus, where data obtained from 
foreign authorities forms the basis of an automated decision supported by data mining, the 
state needs to have appropriate legal provisions in place that explicitly authorize the 
operation and provide protections to safeguard individual rights.  In practice, data mining is 
generally not the sole basis for administrative decisions, but may provide the point of 
departure for a series of events that lead up to a decision.  For instance, data mining is often 
used to single out individuals for closer scrutiny and further investigation may lead to a 
decision with adverse consequences for that individual’s rights.  Whether such uses of data 
mining represent the rendering of automated decisions is likely to depend upon the precise 
facts and circumstances in each case.  The decision to single out an individual for greater 
scrutiny—implicating the right to respect for private life—may in itself represent an 
automated decision with adverse effects on the rights of individuals. 
 
3.4. Conclusion 
 
Although data protection law may have limited application in the realms of law enforcement 
and national security, certain aspects of data protection law will apply.  In particular, the 
OECD Guidelines ensure that the basic principles of data protection generally apply to 
counter-terrorism data mining and the EU Charter provides basic rights which can only be 
limited to the extent necessary for the protection of national security.  Article 7 of the 
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Council of Europe Convention on Automatic Processing will also apply, requiring that states 
provide adequate security measures for the protection of personal data.  Additionally, the 
EU Framework Decision applies whenever a programme makes use of personal data that has 
been transferred from another state.  Moreover, as noted above, the ECtHR will enforce 
aspects of the Convention on Automatic Processing within the context of Article 8 of the 
ECHR.  Thus, data protection law will effectively be imposed under the rubric of the right to 
respect for private life. 
 
4. Non-Discrimination 
4.1. Law 
 
The UDHR, the ICCPR, the ECHR, and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights all contain 
provisions  guaranteeing the right to equality and non-discrimination on the basis of, among 
other grounds, race, colour, national origin, religion, and gender.  Additionally, at the UN 
level, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms Racial Discrimination (CERD) and the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 
provide more specific provisions pertaining to racial and gender discrimination, respectively. 
 
4.1.1. Scope 
 
Article 1 of the UDHR declares that all human beings are equal in dignity and rights.  Article 2 
provides that all persons are entitled to the rights and freedoms laid out in the Declaration 
“without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”  Article 7 guarantees 
equality before the law, as well as equal protection of the law, for all persons 
 
Similarly, the ICCPR calls on signatories to respect and ensure the Covenant rights for all 
individuals “without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status” in Article 
2 and to guarantee the equal enjoyment of civil and political rights under the Convention for 
both men and women in Article 3.  Article 26, in contrast, guarantees non-discrimination not 
only in the context of other rights but in general and is thus an “autonomous norm”. It 
guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the law for all persons and calls 
for the prohibition of any form of discrimination and equal and effective protection for all 
persons against such discrimination.  In addition to the grounds of distinction explicitly listed 
in Articles 2 and 26 of the ICCPR, differential treatment on the basis of a wide range of 
further grounds has been recognized as an interference with the right to non-discrimination, 
including the grounds of nationality158 and age.159  The Covenant prohibits not only direct 
discrimination but also so-called indirect discrimination.  Thus, measures which do not 
appear discriminatory on their face, but nonetheless result in a disproportionate impact on a 
particular group or class, represent an interference with the right to be free from 
discrimination under the ICCPR.160 
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The ECHR declares in Article 14 that the “enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in 
this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, 
colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association 
with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”  An additional protocol, Protocol 
12, has also been drafted and has been ratified by 18 member states of the Council of 
Europe.161  The substantive part of the Protocol consists of two provisions.  The first 
provision is identical to Article 14 with the exception that it applies to “any right set forth by 
law” as opposed to the “the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention”.  The second 
provision prohibits discrimination against any person at the hands of “any public authority 
on any ground such as those mentioned in [the first provision].” 
 
Article 14 of the ECHR is a “subordinate” or “parasitic” provision in that it only applies to 
discrimination that involves the enjoyment of another right or freedom guaranteed by the 
ECHR.162  According to the ECtHR, in order to invoke Article 14, an applicant must show that 
the facts of the case fall “within the ambit” of another substantive Convention right.163 
However, there is no need to show that there has been a violation of that Convention right.  
Due to the inclusion of the “other status” category, the number of grounds of differential 
treatment which may be found to violate Article 14 is theoretically unlimited.164   
 
The ECHR may also prohibit indirect discrimination as suggested by the DH v. Czech Republic 
case. 165   There, the applicants argued that they had been discriminated against as members 
of the Roma community by being placed in special schools for intellectually less able children 
where they received an inferior education.  Although the local educational policy did not 
directly discriminate against Roma, it ultimately had a discriminatory result, since a 
disproportionate number of Roma children were sent to the special schools as compared 
with non-Roma children.166 As applicants may find it very difficult to prove that an 
apparently neutral measure has a disproportionate impact on particular groups, the ECtHR 
held in DH that less strict evidential rules should apply in cases of indirect discrimination: 
“statistics which appear on critical examination to be reliable and significant” may be 
sufficient prima facie evidence of indirect discrimination.167 
 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union prohibits in Article 21(1) 
discrimination on the basis of “any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, 
genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a 
national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation.”  Article 21(2) 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of national origin “[w]ithin the scope of application of 
the Treaty establishing the European Community and of the Treaty on European Union”. 
 
4.1.2. Justified Differential Treatment 
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According to the established jurisprudence of both the HRC and the ECtHR, differential 
treatment may be justified under the ICCPR and the ECHR if it is based on reasonable and 
objective criteria.168  The ECtHR has articulated the criteria for distinguishing between 
justified and unjustified differential treatment as follows: “[T]he Court, following the 
principles which may be extracted from the legal practice of a large number of democratic 
states, holds that the principle of equality of treatment is violated if the distinction has no 
objective and reasonable justification.  The existence of such a justification must be assessed 
in relation to the aim and effects of the measure under consideration, regard being had to 
the principles which normally prevail in democratic societies.  A difference of treatment in 
the exercise of a right laid down in the Convention must not only pursue a legitimate aim: 
Article 14 is likewise violated when it is clearly established that there is no reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be 
realised.”169  This test, requiring that any difference in treatment must (1) pursue a 
legitimate aim and (2) be proportionate, is very similar to the test used to assess the 
permissibility of limitations of Article 8 of the ECHR, described above. 
 
Certain grounds of distinction are regarded as inherently suspect and therefore require 
particularly strict scrutiny. The grounds attracting the greatest degree of attention and most 
likely to be declared unjustified are race, ethnicity, sex, and religion.170 With regard to 
ethnicity, for example, the ECtHR has stressed that “no difference in treatment which is 
based exclusively or to a decisive extent on a person’s ethnic origin is capable of being 
objectively justified in a contemporary democratic society built on the principles of pluralism 
and respect for different cultures.”171 Similarly, with regard to distinctions based on sex the 
Court has observed that “very weighty reasons would have to be advanced before a 
difference in treatment on the ground of sex could be regarded as compatible with the 
[ECHR].”172 
 
4.2. Implications for Data Mining 
4.2.1. Whether Data Mining Represents Differential Treatment 
 
As noted in D08.2, some forms of data mining effectively amount to profiling.  Although 
profiling need not include consideration of personal characteristics, some programmes have 
clearly included or intend to include considerations of sex, age, race, national or ethnic 
origin, and religion.  The German Rasterfahndung is one clear example, but also systems that 
rely on Advance Passenger Information would include criteria such as sex, age, and 
nationality.173  The objectives for processing such information may vary from programme to 
programme.  In a best case scenario, an individual’s data may simply receive more attention 
in a back office or national security agency.  In other scenarios, a data mining programme 
may result in a person being subjected to additional screening procedures at an airport.  In 
more extreme scenarios, it may ultimately mean that an individual is prevented from 
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boarding a flight, denied entry to a country, arrested and interrogated, or denied the 
freedom to pursue economic activities, due to restrictions placed on a bank account. 
 
To the extent that data mining that includes such personal data results in differential 
treatment for certain groups of persons, it implicates the right to non-discrimination.  Since, 
in addition to potential “second-order violations” of the right to liberty or due process 
guarantees, all these applications of data mining amount to an interference with the right to 
privacy, they involve differential treatment that is, in principle, prohibited by the norms 
guaranteeing non-discrimination referred to above, regardless of whether these are 
“subordinate norms” (such as Article 14 of the ECHR) or “autonomous norms” (such as 
Article 26 of the ICCPR). 
 
4.2.2. Whether Differential Treatment May Be Justified 
 
Data mining programmes that involve differential treatment based exclusively or to a 
decisive extent on one (or several) of the grounds that are treated as inherently suspect 
(such as race, ethnicity, religion or sex) may never be justified.  As far as data mining involves 
differential treatment based on other grounds or on a combination of a range of factors, it 
may be justified if it is carried out in pursuit of a legitimate aim and in a manner that is 
proportionate to that aim.  
 
As stated above, the prevention of terrorism will be recognized as a legitimate aim.  The 
decisive question is therefore whether data mining involving differential treatment is a 
proportionate means of achieving that objective.  Thus, it must be considered, first, whether 
such counter-terrorism data mining programmes are a suitable and effective means of 
countering terrorism and, second, what kind of negative effects such programmes may 
produce.174 
 
In D08.2, we found that evidence verifying the relative effectiveness of data mining 
programmes is generally lacking.  We also pointed out that counter-terrorism data mining 
programmes often involve considerable costs for the respective government agencies (in 
terms of financial costs, human resources, information overload, following up on false 
positives etc.) as well as serious negative impacts for those subject to these data mining 
programmes (in terms of human rights violations). Of course, the proportionality of a given 
state measure can only be assessed having regard to the specific circumstances of the case 
at hand. However, what can generally be said is that large-scale data mining programmes 
that fail to produce any results, involve considerable costs to government agencies and 
interfere with the human rights of a great number of individuals (such as, for example, the 
German Rasterfahndung) will fail to meet the proportionality test. 
 
5. Best Practices and Guidelines for Human Rights Compatibility 
 
In order to comply with the various requirements established in human rights law presented 
above, we recommend that states undertake the following measures when implementing 
data mining programmes for counter-terrorism purposes.  We suggest that states will need 
to establish a legal framework to provide explicit authorization of the programme, notice to 
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everyone of the use of the programme, and appropriate safeguards for the rights of 
individuals.  Additionally, an institutional framework will be required to provide oversight of 
the use of the programme and ensure accountability for misuse.  Lastly, an implementation 
framework should be established to ensure ground-level compliance with the law and 
should include training for agents and officials, the development and implementation of 
internal procedural rules, and appropriate IT system design and architecture. 
5.1. Legal Framework 
 
National law pertaining to the use of data mining programmes for counter-terrorism efforts 
should provide the following: 
 
a. A description of the offences which the programme will be aimed at addressing 
or preventing or in the prosecution of which it is intended to assist as well as the 
precise purpose of the programme 
 
In the event that “terrorism” is explicitly defined in national criminal law, terrorism may be 
named as an offence for which the programme may be implemented.  Additionally, there 
may be other offences defined in national criminal law that may be related to threats to 
national security which states may choose to include under the targeted offences of a 
particular data mining programme.  In particular, aviation-related offences such as hijacking 
or attempts to detonate explosives on aircraft should be named in those programmes aimed 
at providing airline screening.  The use of such programmes, however, may not be 
permissible to uncover drug trafficking unless the level of intrusion is appropriate for such 
lesser offences.  
 
b. A description of the classes of persons who fall within the scope of the 
programme 
 
In addition to the offences which the programme is aimed at addressing, the law should 
clarify whether the programme will only target suspected (potential) offenders or also their 
accomplices, associates, etc.   
 
c. A definition of the general scope of operation of the programme 
 
Defining the scope of operation and the context in which a programme will operate 
reinforces the purpose specification principle and forces decision-makers to contemplate the 
optimization of effectiveness, while limiting the risk of human rights violations.  Additionally, 
it serves to apprise everyone of the programme’s existence and to obtain a general 
understanding of its function.  The law need not describe the operation of the programme in 
such detail as to allow individuals to circumvent the programme.  Nonetheless, it should 
provide enough information to permit everyone to know under what circumstances their 
personal data may be subject to processing. 
 
d. Definition of the types of data to be used by the programme 
 
Specifying the type of data to be used by a data mining programme serves to limit the data 
that is subjected to processing, and thus limits the scope of interference with the right to 
respect for private life.  Additionally, it informs everyone of the nature and extent of 
interference with their rights that may occur and thus complies with the foreseeability 
requirement enforced by the ECtHR. Governments should especially avoid the use of types 
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of data that reflect the race, ethnicity, sex, or religion of data subjects and be hesitant to use 
data reflecting language, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, or 
birth, unless they can demonstrate that the inclusion of such factors genuinely enhances the 
effectiveness of the data mining programme in question. 
 
e. Definition of the permissible duration of the programme 
 
One distinction in the Weber and Liberty cases, was the fact that the German statute had 
placed a default time limit on the use of strategic monitoring, whereas UK law had not 
defined any such limit.  The G10 law in Germany would appear to be aimed at addressing 
specific, identified threats as opposed to an open, “always on” fishing expedition.175  The 
imposition of a time limit would also serve as another limitation on the scope of harm which 
the use of a programme would incur and provide an opportunity for a post-run review to 
assess whether further use of the programme was warranted.  However, the law should 
provide that use of the programme should be discontinued immediately if at any time the 
conditions which justified the initial authorization are no longer present or use of the 
programme is no longer necessary. 
 
There is, however, a certain conflict in the practice of signals intelligence monitoring and the 
imposition of time limits since signals intelligence-related monitoring is often used as a 
means of detecting threats.  Thus, states that rely on this form of early warning system may 
argue that they will be unable to identify specific threats without conducting such persistent 
surveillance.  It is unclear how the ECtHR would react to such arguments.  Yet, the same 
conflict applies to many forms of data mining which are utilized to provide constant 
background monitoring.  The imposition of time limits is not consistent with the purpose of 
such programmes.  
 
f. The procedure for obtaining a warrant or other form of authorization for the use 
of the programme, including identification of those parties empowered to grant 
authorization 
 
The German procedures for authorization of strategic monitoring as outlined in Weber met 
with the ECtHR's approval.  One of the features of the German system which distinguished it 
from that of the UK was the fact that authorization did not rest solely in the hands of one 
party or agency.  A multi-party approval procedure can provide internal checks and balances 
against abuse of power or neglect in the safeguarding of human rights.  Additionally, the 
German law required that the order authorizing the use of strategic monitoring had to 
describe and provide reasons justifying the particular nature, scope, and duration of the 
monitoring.  Such a requirement can not only serve in the ex ante assessment of the 
appropriateness of the measure, as is the case with warrant proceedings, but can also serve 
to provide a record for ex post review and regular audits for legal compliance. 
 
g. Procedures for data handling, including the period of retention, authorized 
transfer and sharing of data, and procedures for the destruction of data 
 
The law should provide that personal data be destroyed as soon as they are no longer 
needed to achieve the purpose of the programme.  Procedures should be established in the 
law that call for periodic review to determine whether any currently stored personal data 
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meet the conditions for destruction.176  The law should also define destruction in terms of 
rendering the data completely irretrievable, so that they may not be reconstructed or 
accessed in any form, using the best technical means and methods available.  Standards for 
the transfer of data both to domestic authorities as well as international authorities should 
also be defined in law.  Transfer to authorities with law enforcement or prosecutorial 
authority should only occur where necessary to protect a significant legal interest or where 
there is sufficient basis for the suspicion that the commission of a crime has occurred or is 
being planned.  Data protection principles would require that international transfers should 
only occur where the recipient state provides an adequate level of data protection. 
 
h. Procedures for notification and remedial procedures 
 
Whenever instances of the use of a data mining programme take place in secret, individuals 
whose personal data has been subjected to processing may be entitled to notification that 
their rights have been affected.  Once a particular use of data mining has been terminated, 
affected individuals should be notified of the processing of their data whenever notification 
would not jeopardize the goals of the programme.  Article 13 of the ECHR guarantees the 
right to an effective remedy before a national authority for any violation of rights provided 
under the Convention.  The provision of remedies for violations involving personal data is 
also consistent with the data protection principle of accountability.  National law should 
provide some process by which affected individuals may seek redress.  Redress may entail 
the award of monetary compensation in some circumstances.  Governments should also 
develop procedures for eliminating the reoccurrence of false positives that have adverse 
results for the enjoyment of rights of individuals as well as the correction of incorrect data in 
underlying databases. 
 
5.2. Institutional Framework 
Governments will need to establish an institutional framework for oversight of surveillance 
powers, including the use of data mining.   
 
a. Procedures for Authorization 
Governments may provide that the authorization for the use of data mining originate with a 
warrant-like proceeding or an executive order.  Both the HRC and the ECtHR have shown a 
preference for reliance on judicial authority.  However, the ECtHR found the use of an 
executive order for strategic monitoring in the Weber case to be acceptable in light of the 
safeguards provided by German law.  In either case, the possibility for subsequent judicial 
review should be provided.  Governments that choose to require a warrant proceeding may 
wish to establish specialized surveillance courts for the exclusive hearing of such matters.  
Where this is the case, additional measures may need to be taken to ensure that such courts 
remain independent and critical despite their secret nature. 
 
b. Oversight Authorities 
 
The reliance on oversight mechanisms in which multiple actors with different interests and 
roles are involved at different stages of the decision-making process can provide a robust 
system of checks and balances against abuse.  Oversight authorities should receive regular 
reports of the use of data mining and the underlying authorization.  Such authorities should 
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be empowered to examine the justifications given for authorization and question the 
authorities involved in the decision to provide authorization.  Additionally, governments may 
choose to impose the pre-approval of one or more such oversight bodies as a prerequisite 
for authorization.  Governments should regulate the composition of such bodies or the 
appointment of persons to such bodies in order to ensure its independence and qualification 
for its task.  Governments should also provide an oversight authority with the power to 
conduct investigations and discipline malfeasants or wrongdoers.  Alternatively or in 
addition to a review body, such as Europol’s Joint Supervisory Body, which conducts regular 
reviews of data handling practices, governments may choose to assign the national data 
protection supervisor a role in overseeing data handling procedures.   
  
5.3. Implementation Framework 
 
The implementation framework should be targeted not only at the individuals who will run 
and operate data mining programmes or have access to the underlying data or data mining 
results, but also at the system architecture of the information technology resources utilized 
by such programmes.  Additionally, the framework should incorporate a set of internal rules 
to define procedures for personnel and authorities.  
 
Training 
Users of data mining programmes and anyone likely to handle the underlying data or 
programme results should receive comprehensive training in the legal standards and 
required procedures falling within the legal framework referenced above.  These individuals 
should also be instructed in the requirements of international and domestic human rights 
law and data protection standards.  Users of data mining programmes and their results 
should be provided with a substantial understanding of how the programme functions in 
addition to the required knowledge for its effective use.  Instruction in the operation of the 
programme should include raising awareness of the potential for false positives and other 
sources of error. 
  
Internal Rules 
Internal rules of the relevant government agencies should be developed to provide the 
following procedures and ensure that agency action is in conformity with legal 
requirements: 
a. Procedures for preserving confidentiality 
b. Procedures for disclosure of data mining results and their 
incorporation into reports 
c. Procedures on sharing results and reports (both nationally and 
internationally) 
d. Procedures for the storage, retention, and destruction of data as 
well as the notification of affected parties 
 
System Architecture 
The infrastructure and design of the system performing and supporting data mining should 
be aimed at minimizing the likelihood of unauthorized access or disclosure.  Where feasible, 
counter-terrorism officials may want to use closed networks that have no access to wider 
systems or the internet.  Systems which may be exposed to the internet or other networks 
or systems should employ the best possible security to prevent unauthorized access.  The 
system should also be subject to strict access controls.  Access should be limited to those 
individuals who have a real need to use the system for the performance of their duties and 
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have received the appropriate training in its use and operation as well as those individuals 
who are charged with maintaining the operation of the system.  Access as well as editing, 
transfer, or deletion of files or data should be logged for quality control and legal compliance 
purposes.  In addition, systems may make use of privacy enhancing technologies such as 
encryption of the underlying data, anonymization or selected revelation procedures.  
Selected revelation masks identifying data until the user has demonstrated a need to 
uncover the identity of a particular individual.  Automated processes may also be used to 
provide auditing.  For instance, access logs may themselves be subjected to data mining to 
identify suspicious instances or patterns of access.  Such a use of data mining may also 
reinforce users’ sensitivities to the limits of data mining. 
 
 
 
